Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 4 Summer 2022

Article 12

6-1-2022

COPPA and Educational Technologies: The Need for Additional
Online Privacy Protections for Students
Diana S. Skowronski
dskowronski1@student.gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
Diana S. Skowronski, COPPA and Educational Technologies: The Need for Additional Online Privacy
Protections for Students, 38 GA. ST. U. L. REV. (2022).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss4/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Georgia State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more
information, please contact gfowke@gsu.edu.

Skowronski: COPPA and Educational Technologies

COPPA AND EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES:
THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ONLINE PRIVACY
PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENTS
Diana S. Skowronski*
ABSTRACT
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) is a
federal privacy law that strictly governs how websites collect and
distribute personal information from children under the age of
thirteen. Children who use Internet sites require additional privacy
protections because children may not fully understand the risks
associated with releasing their personal information online. Despite
recognizing the need for stringent privacy protections for children, a
major flaw in the statute’s application to schools undercuts the
purpose of providing children with an extra layer of protection. The
problem is that COPPA does not apply to schools as entities, meaning
administrators or teachers can consent to the release of a child’s
personal information without the child’s parent ever knowing.
Ultimately, COPPA protections weaken once children step into school
and begin using educational websites or technologies at the
instruction of their teachers.
COPPA needs reworking, and the statute’s shortcomings have
become especially clear after the COVID-19 pandemic forced millions
of students online. COPPA’s school exception makes it a flawed statute
to begin with, and its application in an environment where virtual
learning and distance education are the new normal makes COPPA
outdated and ineffective. This Note argues for a comprehensive federal
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privacy law with stronger enforcement measures that can withstand
changes in technology and its ever-evolving role in our lives.
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INTRODUCTION
There is no comprehensive federal law that regulates Internet
privacy protections in the United States.1 Instead, various federal and
state laws address online privacy issues in a disconnected way, leaving
certain data collection practices overlooked and unregulated. 2
Generally, Internet privacy laws are a division of the “larger world of
data privacy” that seeks to protect Internet users from exposure of
sensitive information (including exposure of their personal
information and other confidential data, such as financial
information).3 Privacy laws exist because “[e]very time you visit a
website, enter your credit or debit card information, sign up for an
account, give out your email, fill out online forms, post on social
media, or store images or documents in cloud storage, you are
releasing personal information into cyberspace.”4 Your digital
footprint is everywhere.5
But what about children and their personal information? Surely
young children are not engaging in sophisticated Internet activities
1. Internet Privacy Laws Revealed — How Your Personal Information Is Protected Online,
THOMSON
REUTERS
[hereinafter
Internet
Privacy
Laws
Revealed],
https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/how-your-personal-information-is-protected-online
[https://perma.cc/APL3-ECE4] (“There is no single law regulating online privacy.”); Thorin Klosowski,
The State of Consumer Data Privacy Laws in the US (And Why It Matters), N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/state-of-privacy-laws-in-us/
[https://perma.cc/3C9R-9897]
(“[T]here’s no single, comprehensive federal law regulating how most companies collect, store, or share
customer data.”).
2. See Internet Privacy Laws Revealed, supra note 1. The article describes Internet privacy protection
laws in the United States as a “patchwork” of federal and state statutes, further emphasizing that there is
no unified approach to regulating how website operators collect personal information from users online.
Id. Federal laws currently regulate areas concerning unfair and deceptive commercial practices, electronic
communications, unlawful computer-related activities, unsolicited commercial emails, and data collection
by financial institutions. Id. States have also adopted privacy laws including consumer protection statutes,
laws protecting categories of personal information, information securities laws, and data breach laws. Id.
3. See Internet Privacy Laws Revealed, supra note 1; see also What is Data Privacy? STORAGE
NETWORKING
INDUS.
ASS’N,
https://www.snia.org/education/what-is-data-privacy
[https://perma.cc/4YP3-VRJP].
4. Internet Privacy Laws Revealed, supra note 1; Thorin Klosowski, How to Protect Your Digital
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/guides/privacy-project/how-to-protect-your-digitalprivacy [https://perma.cc/74NX-XG3S] (“Companies and websites track everything you do online.
Every ad, social network button, and website collects information about your location, browsing habits,
and more. The data collected reveals more about you than you might expect.”).
5. Internet Privacy Laws Revealed, supra note 1.
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such as online banking; so, are children personally at risk when they
use the Internet for games or education purposes?6 This Note argues
that the answer is yes. After Congress started recognizing privacy risks
during the late 1990s that directly affected children, it enacted the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which gives
special online privacy protections to children. 7 Although children use
the Internet for less sophisticated purposes, online privacy restrictions
for children under COPPA are “stricter than those governing data
about older people” because children (being young and
impressionable) are “particularly vulnerable” to cybersecurity
attacks.8
Despite being a stricter privacy rule in theory, COPPA is criticized
for being weakly enforced and generally ineffective. 9 One concerning
gap in privacy protections is that COPPA does not apply to schools as
entities; if a school contracts with an educational website or
technology for its students, the school can consent for that website or

6. See Internet Privacy: Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Before the Subcomm. on Cts.
& Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 26, 1998) [hereinafter Medine FTC Prepared
Statement] (statement of David Medine, Associate Director for Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, Federal Trade Commission) (“These young people are not shopping or banking online, but
parents still have serious concerns about the online collection and use of personal information from
children.”); see also Internet Use in Children, AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY,
https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_Families/FFF-Guide/Children-Online059.aspx [https://perma.cc/C3DT-HJCR] (Oct. 2015). Young children do not use the Internet for the same
purposes as adults. Id. Instead, “[m]ost online services give children resources such as encyclopedias,
current events coverage, and access to libraries and other valuable material.” Id. “They can also play
games and communicate with friends on social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, etc.”
Id.
7. Medine FTC Prepared Statement, supra note 6; 15 U.S.C. § 6501.
8. Josh Fruhlinger, COPPA Explained: How This Law Protects Children’s Privacy, CSO (Feb. 8,
2021, 2:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3605113/coppa-explained-how-this-law-protectschildrens-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/NDV3-QEVP]; Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked
Questions, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2020) [hereinafter Complying with COPPA],
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions0 [https://perma.cc/M3M9-NDWP].
9. See What’s Going on with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)?, OSANO (Jan.
14, 2021), https://www.osano.com/articles/whats-new-coppa [https://perma.cc/G3XE-LPXY]. COPPA
enforcement “should be tougher on giant technology companies that violate the law.” Id. Anna O’Donnell,
Why the VPPA and COPPA Are Outdated: How Netflix, YouTube, and Disney+ Can Monitor Your Family
at No Real Cost, 55 GA. L. REV. 467, 470 (2020). COPPA’s “enforcement procedures are lacking.” Id.
Lauren A. Matecki, Update: COPPA Is Ineffective Legislation! Next Steps for Protecting Youth Privacy
Rights in the Social Networking Era, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 369, 370 (2010) (“[C]ommentators have
criticized COPPA as ineffective.”).
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technology to collect students’ information.10 In practice, schools
release students’ personal information without parental consent simply
because COPPA does not apply to schools. 11
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has seen a massive
shift to online learning, COPPA’s inapplicability to schools is a cause
for concern.12 Because the pandemic resulted in nationwide school
closures, school districts “rac[ed]” to provide students with distance
learning and virtual education options as a substitute for in-person
learning.13 As a result, the unprecedented increase in educational
technologies is bringing “more issues and threats in terms of
cybersecurity.”14 Now, we are left with millions of students using
online education technology services in a world of heightened
cybersecurity threats, yet the existing privacy statute enacted two
decades ago does little to address this predicament. 15
10. See Complying with COPPA, supra note 8. The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) “Frequently
Asked Questions” page explains that, under COPPA, schools can allow website operators to collect
personal information from students:
Many school districts contract with third-party website operators to offer online
programs solely for the benefit of their students and for the school system – for
example, homework help lines, individualized education modules, online research
and organizational tools, or web-based testing services. In these cases, the schools
may act as the parent’s agent and can consent under COPPA to the collection of
kids’ information on the parent’s behalf.
Id.; K-12 BLUEPRINT, EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT COPPA 1 (2014),
https://www.k12blueprint.com/sites/default/files/COPPA-101.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LBN8-ZAL8]
(“COPPA does not, however, apply to ‘school districts that contract with websites to offer online programs
solely for the benefit of their students.’”).
11. See Benjamin Herold, COPPA and Schools: The (Other) Federal Student Privacy Law, Explained,
EDUC. WK. (July 28, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/technology/coppa-and-schools-the-other-federalstudent-privacy-law-explained/2017/07 [https://perma.cc/GR4E-L6JC].
12. Anisha Reddy & Amelia Vance, Social (Media) Distancing: Online Learning During a Pandemic,
STUDENT PRIV. COMPASS (Mar. 31, 2020), https://studentprivacycompass.org/social-media-distancingcovid19/ [https://perma.cc/3VG9-Q6QL].
13. Id.
14. NAVID ALI KHAN, SARFRAZ NAWAZ BROHI & NOOR ZAMAN, TEN DEADLY CYBER SECURITY
THREATS AMID COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2020) (“With the advancement of technology, nowadays,
cybersecurity has become very challenging. It’s common for hackers, attackers, and scammers to take
advantage of emergencies, particularly in times when people are frightened, desperate, and most
vulnerable. The outbreak of coronavirus is no different. Bad actors around the world are using the
coronavirus as a new tool for their evil deeds in the form of hacking, attacking, or scams.”).
15. See Lisa Weintraub Schifferle, COPPA Guidance for Ed Tech Companies and Schools During the
Coronavirus, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 9, 2020, 8:18 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2020/04/coppa-guidance-ed-tech-companies-schools-during-coronavirus
[https://perma.cc/H8KH-XYGD].
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Part I of this Note explains COPPA’s origins and how the statute
requires the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce COPPA’s
regulations for protecting children’s online privacy. Part II analyzes
COPPA’s shortcomings in the realm of educational technologies. In
Part III, the Author proposes a COPPA overhaul in favor of a
comprehensive federal privacy law to protect children’s personal
information in virtual education settings.
I. BACKGROUND
By the 1990s, 9.8 million children were going online for activities
like “homework or informal learning, playing games, browsing or for
e-mail/chat rooms,” and parents developed concerns about their
children’s personal information being collected and used.16 Congress
therefore enacted COPPA to restrict website operators from soliciting
personal information from children and to give parents control over
the information that website operators collected from their children
online.17 The COPPA statute limits online privacy protection to
children who are under thirteen years old, reasoning that “children
under the age of thirteen do not have the developmental capacity to
understand the nature of a website’s request for information and its
privacy implications.”18 The idea is that children lack the ability to
meaningfully consent to the release of their personal information

16. Medine FTC Prepared Statement, supra note 6 (statement of David Medine) (“Several workshop
participants voiced concern at the 1997 Workshop about online activities that enable children to post or
disclose their names, street addresses, or e-mail addresses in areas accessible to the public, such as chat
rooms, bulletin boards, and electronic pen pal programs, creating a serious risk that the information may
fall into the wrong hands.”).
17. Complying with COPPA, supra note 8. The FTC’s “Frequently Asked Questions” page explains
that Congress enacted COPPA in 1998, which went into effect in 2000, and that the main goal of COPPA
is to put parents in control of how website operators collect information from young children online. Id.;
History of COPPA Violations, PRIVO, https://www.privo.com/history-of-coppa-violations
[https://perma.cc/58UU-JMKY] (“COPPA was enacted by the United States in 1998, and became
effective on April 21, 2000. The FTC enforces violations concerning children’s online privacy and state
attorneys general.”); 2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION: CABLE, BROADCASTING, SATELLITE, AND
THE INTERNET ¶ 17C.03 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2022).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 6501; Joshua Warmund, Note, Can COPPA Work? An Analysis of the Parental
Consent Measures in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 189, 190 (2000).
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without parental involvement. 19 One website in particular, KidsCom,
gained negative attention during the 1990s for collecting information
from children who did not fully understand what was happening to
their personal information, and it was KidsCom’s practices that led to
COPPA’s enactment.20
A. COPPA’s Origins
KidsCom, “one of the [I]nternet’s first child-focused sites,” caught
the attention of the Center for Media Education in the 1990s.21 At the
time, KidsCom collected children’s personal information through
registration forms, contests, and pen-pal programs.22 The Center for
Media Education drafted a petition urging the FTC to investigate
KidsCom’s information collecting practices, which the organization
claimed were in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act).23 The FTC is the relevant federal agency
to investigate such concerns because it is tasked with protecting
consumers by stopping unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices that
occur in the marketplace, and it has authority to conduct investigations,
sue companies that violate the law, and create rules to protect the
marketplace.24 Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, which the Center for
19. See Alexis M. Peddy, Dangerous Classroom “App”-titude: Protecting Student Privacy from
Third-Party Educational Service Providers, 2017 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 125, 132 (2017).
20. See Fruhlinger, supra note 8.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see also How COPPA Came About, INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 14, 2004),
https://www.informationweek.com/it-life/how-coppa-came-about [https://perma.cc/Z9HK-4G2K]. The
article provides an overview of how KidsCom collected data from young children:
Online since February 1995, KidsCom was one of the first children-only sites on
the Internet. It didn’t use cookies to gather information, but collected data through
registration forms, contests, and pen-pal programs. Its site was directed at children
from ages four to [fifteen] and came under criticism for its collection practices.
Id.
23. Protection of Children’s Privacy on the World Wide Web: Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade
Comm’n Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp. (Sept. 23, 1998)
[hereinafter Pitofsky FTC Prepared Statement] (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission).
24. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/X38L-5VUU]; A Message from Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/ftc-2013/message-chairwoman-edith-ramirez
[https://perma.cc/JDB9-N47Y] (“The FTC is a bipartisan federal agency with a unique dual mission to
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Media Education claimed KidsCom was violating, gives the FTC the
power to initiate enforcement actions when “unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce . . . are . . . declared unlawful.”25
The FTC investigated KidsCom’s data collection practices and
responded in a staff opinion letter (KidsCom Letter), where it shared
its determination that KidsCom violated FTC rules.26 The FTC urged
website operators to include parental notices on their websites and to
require parental consent before releasing personally identifying
information to third parties.27 By making these recommendations via
the KidsCom Letter, “the FTC publicly announced its guidelines for
data collection from children on the Internet for the first time.”28 Less
than a year following the KidsCom Letter, the FTC presented a report
before Congress detailing its concerns surrounding the online
collection of children’s personal information and the need for parental
involvement in personal information disclosures. 29 Following the
FTC’s report, as well as an FTC public workshop consisting of
industry representatives (including website operators and technology
companies) debating privacy law issues, Congress officially enacted
COPPA in 1998.30
protect consumers and promote competition . . . the FTC is dedicated to advancing consumer interests
while encouraging innovation and competition in our dynamic economy.”); A Brief Overview of the
Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE
COMM’N [hereinafter Overview of FTC Authority], https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-wedo/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/38KN-HP7Y] (May 2021).
25. Overview of FTC Authority, supra note 24. FTC has investigative, enforcement, and rulemaking
authority to protect consumers and promote competition, and its authority is derived from the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Id.
26. Fruhlinger, supra note 8; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Sets Forth Principles for
Online Information Collection from Children (July 16, 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/1997/07/ftc-staff-sets-forth-principles-online-information-collection [https://perma.cc/Z5DASP77]; Pitofsky FTC Prepared Statement, supra note 23 (statement of Robert Pitofsky). Pitofsky’s
statement identifies a deceptive practice to misrepresent the reason for collecting personal data from
children, such as claiming that information is being collected for a contest despite it being collected for a
mailing list, which constitutes a violation of FTC rules. Id.
27. Rajiv Ch & rasekaran, FTC Rules on Online Data Collection, WASH. POST (July 17, 1997),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1997/07/17/ftc-rules-on-online-datacollection/a7e3ab7f-8deb-4613-8ae0-a48eda19f466/ [https://perma.cc/T4KX-5VDY].
28. Warmund, supra note 18, at 193.
29. See Medine FTC Prepared Statement, supra note 6.
30. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888-01, 59,888 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to
be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312). In addition to industry representatives, around 100 other
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B. COPPA Requirements and its Enforcement Process
COPPA prohibits commercial website operators and online services
operators from collecting children’s personal information from
websites that are either directed at children under thirteen years old or
from websites where operators have actual knowledge that children
use their sites.31 To comply with COPPA, website operators must take
specific measures to clearly communicate how they collect personal
information, and they must obtain parental consent before collecting
and using this data.32
The type of “personal information” protected under COPPA
includes names, addresses, online contact information, screen names
or usernames, telephone numbers, Social Security numbers, files
containing the child’s picture or voice, geolocation information, or
information that an operator can combine with an identifier to
recognize the user. 33 If website operators collect this personal
information without parental consent, the FTC has the authority to

parties—including privacy advocates, consumer groups, and other government agency
representatives—attended the FTC public workshop. Id. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss how
parental consent was currently being obtained, how email could be implemented to obtain consent, and
whether other methods of obtaining parental consent could be used in the future. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 6501.
31. § 6501; Complying with COPPA, supra note 8. COPPA requirements apply not only to
child-focused websites but also to websites with general audiences where website operators have actual
knowledge that they are collecting personal information from children ages thirteen and under. Id.
32. See Complying with COPPA, supra note 8. Specifically, to comply with COPPA, website
operators must first post an online privacy policy describing their information collection practices. Id.
Second, operators must provide notice directly to parents and obtain their consent before collecting
personal information from their children. Id. Third, website operators must give parents the option of
consenting to the data collection while “prohibiting the operator from disclosing that [data] to third
parties.” Id. Next, website operators must give parents access to their children’s personal information to
review or delete the data. Id. Operators must also allow parents to prevent any further use or collection of
their children’s information. Id. Website operators must maintain the “confidentiality, security, and
integrity of information they collect from children” and can only retain the information for as long as it is
needed to fulfill the purpose for collecting it. Id. Finally, website operators cannot “condition a child’s
participation in an online activity on the child providing more information than is reasonably necessary to
participate in that activity.” Id.
33. INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, GUIDE TO NAVIGATING COPPA 4 (2019); Complying with
COPPA, supra note 8; Chrissie Scelsi, Children’s Online Privacy Protection, 37 GPSOLO, Sept./Oct.
2020,
at
42,
43–44;
Sean
Meyers,
Guide
to
COPPA,
PRIV.
POL’YS,
https://www.privacypolicies.com/blog/coppa/ [https://perma.cc/Z4FW-NJZL] (May 20, 2021) (“What
constitutes ‘personal information’ is far-reaching and not just limited to things like Social Security
numbers and bank account information.”).
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enforce COPPA and hold website operators liable for civil penalties. 34
Regarding enforcement practices, if the Attorney General fails to
initiate litigation for COPPA violations after notice from the FTC,
“[t]he FTC is . . . authorized to initiate federal district court
proceedings, by its own attorneys, to recover civil penalties for
violations of the COPPA Rule.”35
Despite the FTC having full enforcement authority, commentators
have criticized it for weakly enforcing COPPA.36 Ultimately, “its
enforcement has resulted in small settlements with companies that
have been charged with collecting children’s private information.”37
For example, it took roughly twenty years since COPPA’s enactment
to see a historic settlement between YouTube and the FTC for $170
million in 2019.38
34. Complying with COPPA, supra note 8; The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),
PRIVO, https://www.privo.com/learn-more-about-coppa [https://perma.cc/U3J4-KS3M] (“COPPA
provides the FTC with civil penalty authority to encourage compliance with the COPPA Rule. The FTC
has taken law enforcement action against companies that failed to comply with the provisions of the law.
A court can hold operators who violate the Rule liable for civil penalties of up to $41,484 per violation.”).
35. Complaint at 4, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Google, LLC (No. 19-cv-2642) (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2019);
Benjamin Stein, Plaintiffs Continue Search for De Facto COPPA Right of Action, INFOLAWGROUP (Mar.
25, 2020), https://www.infolawgroup.com/insights/2020/3/23/plaintiffs-continue-search-for-de-factocoppa-right-of-action [https://perma.cc/4YLD-7FZ9]. Because COPPA enforcement authority is vested
solely in the FTC and state Attorneys General, there is no private right of action for COPPA violations.
Id. As a result, parents cannot bring COPPA actions if their children’s personal information is collected
and used without consent. See id. Parents must therefore rely entirely on the FTC to ensure that website
operators are complying with COPPA’s requirements. See id.
36. O’Donnell, supra note 9. O’Donnell describes the FTC’s poor COPPA enforcement history:
As of 2020, over two decades since COPPA was originally enacted, no company
charged by the FTC has ever been taken to court for violating COPPA. This is not
because COPPA sees no action—on the contrary, COPPA is enforced, albeit
weakly, quite often. Instead, the dearth of trials exists because the FTC has settled
every one of its thirty complaints against companies for violating COPPA.
Id. at 481. (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 467.
38. See Lesley Fair, $170 Million FTC-NY YouTube Settlement Offers COPPA Compliance Tips for
Platforms and Providers, FED. TRADE COMM’N BUS. BLOG (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2019/09/170-million-ftc-ny-youtube-settlement-offers-coppa
[https://perma.cc/FN6G-PFMV]; see also O’Donnell, supra note 9, at 488; Complaint, supra note 35, at
6, 8–10. The Complaint alleged that Google and YouTube violated COPPA in several ways: by not
requiring users to create accounts, by marketing popular brands of children’s products and services, by
classifying certain videos and channels as “Made for Kids,” by creating a mobile app called “YouTube
Kids,” by hosting child-directed channels, and by engaging in other kid-focused practices without
disclosing their data collection practices and first obtaining parental consent. Id. at 9, 16–17; Natasha
Singer & Kate Conger, Google Is Fined $170 Million for Violating Children’s Privacy on YouTube, N.Y.
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C. The 2013 Amended COPPA Rule
The gradual increase in COPPA settlement amounts may be
attributed to COPPA’s 2013 amendment. 39 To address changes in
children’s use and access to the Internet through technologies like cell
phones and social media sites, the FTC revised COPPA to expand the
definition of “personal information” and to give parents additional
control over the collection of their children’s data.40 The FTC created
these changes pursuant to the agency’s rulemaking authority; under the
FTC Act, the FTC has exclusive authority to issue rules related to
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 41
Despite the 2013 update, “technological advances and a shift in
marketing practices have called into question the practicality of, and
compliance with, COPPA’s parental consent and personal information
collection requirements.”42 Even though fines for violating COPPA
are becoming greater over time, there are lingering concerns
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/technology/google-youtube-fine-ftc.html
[https://perma.cc/MRM4-KTER] (Aug. 10, 2021). The news article further explains the allegations
against Google and YouTube and how YouTube profited from its conduct:
Regulators said that YouTube, which is owned by Google, had illegally gathered
children’s data—including identification codes used to track web browsing over
time—without their parents’ consent. The site also marketed itself to advertisers as
a top destination for young children, even as it told some advertising firms that they
did not have to comply with the children’s privacy law because YouTube did not
have viewers under [thirteen]. YouTube then made millions of dollars by using the
information harvested from children to target them with ads . . . .
Id.
39. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Revised Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule Goes
into Effect Today (July 1, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/07/revisedchildrens-online-privacy-protection-rule-goes-effect [https://perma.cc/A2W8-DZK6].
40. Id.
41. Overview of FTC Authority, supra note 24. The FTC has rulemaking authority under the FTC Act:
In lieu of relying on actions against individual respondents to determine that
practices are unfair or deceptive, the Commission may use trade regulation rules to
address unfair or deceptive practices that occur commonly.
....
Under Section 18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 57a, the Commission is
authorized to prescribe “rules which define with specificity acts or practices which
are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” within the
meaning of Section 5(a)(1) of the Act.
Id.
42. Kathryn Beaumont Murphy, Meghan Talbot, Jillian Walton, Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr LLP,
FTC
Explores
Changes
to
COPPA
Rule,
JDSUPRA
(Oct.
11,
2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ftc-explores-changes-to-coppa-rule-16445/ [https://perma.cc/CR579M5Q].
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surrounding COPPA’s applicability and enforcement as technology
continues to change rapidly, especially in the wake of the COVID-19
pandemic.43
D. COPPA in the Realm of Educational Technologies
In 2019, even before the COVID-19 pandemic began, the FTC again
recognized the need to update COPPA.44 Although the FTC did not
intend to fully update COPPA in 2019, it began requesting public
comments about the statute as part of the FTC’s rulemaking
authority.45 By doing so, the FTC began its COPPA review process
years earlier than expected, in part because of changes occurring in
educational technologies. 46 The collection of children’s personal data
in the education space is especially problematic because COPPA and
its protections do not apply directly to schools.47 When schools
contract with website operators, the institutions are able to consent to
43. See History of COPPA Violations, supra note 17. Per the timeline of significant COPPA violations
and their settlement amounts, the FTC filed its first complaint for a COPPA violation against
Toysmart.com in 2000, after the company collected personal information and attempted to sell this
information with its assets when it ran into financial difficulty. Id. The most recent complaint over a
COPPA violation, according to the timeline, was against Recolor in 2021 for allowing third-party
advertising networks to collect personal information from the app’s social media features for targeted ads,
which settled for $3 million. Id.; O’Donnell, supra note 9 (“The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
updated COPPA for modern technology and privacy concerns, but its enforcement procedures are
lacking.”).
44. See Lesley Fair, Future of the COPPA Rule: What’s on the Agenda, FED. TRADE COMM’N BUS.
BLOG (Oct. 1, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/10/futurecoppa-rule-whats-agenda [https://perma.cc/BRY3-V8YE] (“Whether it’s social media, the Internet of
Things, or educational technology, do changes in media and the marketplace warrant updates to the Rule?
The FTC staff asked that question . . . .”).
45. Murphy et al., supra note 42 (“The FTC is not yet considering specific changes to COPPA, but as
part of its rulemaking process it is soliciting opinion and commentary about the current state of the
law—its successes and challenges—which may result in further amendments to the law.”); Lesley Fair,
COPPA Comment Deadline Extended to December 11th, FED. TRADE COMM’N BUS. BLOG (Dec. 10,
2019, 9:56 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/12/coppa-commentdeadline-extended-december-11th [https://perma.cc/AW98-UQV5].
46. See Request for Public Comment on the Federal Trade Commission’s Implementation of the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,842, 35,842 (July 25, 2019) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. pt. 312). The FTC usually does a ten-year review of its rules to keep up with marketplace and
technology changes. Id. The previous COPPA review ended in 2013, but the FTC began its review of
COPPA early in 2019, citing questions about the Rule’s application “to the educational technology sector,
to voice-enabled connected devices, and to general audience platforms that host third-party child-directed
content.” Id.
47. Peddy, supra note 19, at 130 (“COPPA does not apply directly to schools as entities.”); Herold,
supra note 11 (“This law directly regulates companies, not schools.”).

Published by Reading Room, 2022

13

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 12

1232

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:4

a website’s collection of personal information from students, which
removes parents’ ability to consent to this data collection. 48 The
COVID-19 pandemic has only complicated matters further.49
Because the pandemic resulted in nationwide school closures,
students had to switch to virtual learning and distance education
options.50 The unprecedented, steep increase in young children using
educational technologies has created significant privacy concerns. 51 In
recognition of the effect that increased education technology usage
would have on COPPA compliance, the FTC created a blog post in
April 2020 with guidance on how education technology companies
and schools can stay COPPA compliant during the transition to remote
learning.52 Within the blog post, the FTC acknowledged that “millions
of students are now using online, educational technology (or ‘ed tech’)
services to engage in remote learning” and stressed the importance of
the “continued need to protect student’s privacy.”53 This
acknowledgment reveals that the FTC is at least aware of the privacy
48. Complying with COPPA, supra note 8.
49. See Peggy Keene, Virtual Classes: The Rush for Online Schooling Has Raised Privacy Concerns,
83 TEX. BAR J. 370, 370 (2020).
50. See Reddy & Vance, supra note 12; see also Cathy Li & Farah Lalani, The COVID-19 Pandemic
Has Changed Education Forever. This is How, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/coronavirus-education-global-covid19-online-digitallearning/ [https://perma.cc/3BH8-DCXJ]. Before COVID-19, the adoption of education technology was
already growing, but there has been “a significant surge in usage since COVID-19.” Id. The COVID-19
pandemic has resulted in a “distinctive rise of e-learning.” Id.; KHAN ET AL., supra note 14 (“To limit the
spread of this novel disease, many countries decided to close educational institutions, including schools,
colleges, and universities. Lecturers are teaching online; in fact, this is happening at a very huge untested
and unprecedented scale.”).
51. See Tiffany C. Li, Privacy in Pandemic: Law, Technology, and Public Health in the COVID-19
Crisis, 52 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 767, 775 (2021) (“Most of the technologies being deployed as COVID-19
responses are not new. . . . [T]he novelty of new technologies is not what matters for understanding how
the law should regulate. Rather, it is what has changed in society that has driven the rise in certain
technologies that we should seek to understand.”). Li stresses that the technologies people are using have
not changed. Id. Instead, the important factor that is causing additional problems is the steep increase in
their usage. Id.; KHAN ET AL., supra note 14. Khan states that “[t]he online video conferencing apps such
as Zoom, Microsoft Teams, and Google Meet have witnessed an exponential increase in new users signing
up daily,” even though Zoom, Microsoft Teams, and Google Meet are not brand-new technologies born
out of the COVID-19 pandemic. See id.
52. Schifferle, supra note 15. The FTC repeatedly stresses in its blog post that “COPPA does not
impose obligations on schools” and simply advises education-technology companies and schools on how
to maintain their COPPA compliance. Id. The blog post gives off the impression that the FTC’s primary
focus is providing guidance for companies to avoid liability under COPPA rather than making children’s
privacy rights the FTC’s primary objective. See id.
53. Id.
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concerns that directly affect students as a group and that the
COVID-19 pandemic is exacerbating these already-existing student
privacy concerns.54
II. ANALYSIS
The FTC acknowledges that protecting student privacy is a pressing
issue during the COVID-19 pandemic, yet COPPA requirements do
not apply to schools as entities and COPPA protections remain limited
to children under the age of thirteen, thus ignoring teenage students.55
COPPA already had major gaps in privacy protections for students
using educational technologies during pre-pandemic times; even
before the pandemic began, “advances in technology and
telecommunications . . . dramatically changed the landscape of
education in the United States.” 56 The COVID-19 pandemic is
therefore one illustration of COPPA’s inadequacies as applied to
students and educational technologies in modern times.
A. Online Privacy Protections Are Becoming Increasingly Necessary
for Students
Privacy threats and data breaches of K-12 educational institutions
are not new.57 Because students use online services for educational
purposes “to access class readings, to view their learning progression,
to watch video demonstrations, to comment on class activities, or to
complete their homework,” these activities put students at risk for
54. See id.; R. Chantz Richens, Privacy in a Pandemic: An Examination of the United States’ Response
to COVID-19 Analyzing Privacy Rights Afforded to Children Under International Law, 28 WILLAMETTE
J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 244, 259 (2021) (“Issues of privacy and children, which have been growing in
recent years, have all but come to a head as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.”).
55. See Schifferle, supra note 15; see also Complying with COPPA, supra note 8; 15 U.S.C. § 6501.
56. PRIV. TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., PROTECTING STUDENT PRIVACY WHILE USING ONLINE
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES: REQUIREMENTS AND BEST PRACTICES 1 (2014), https://tech.ed.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Student-Privacy-and-Online-Educational-Services-February-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FVG-NU4R].
57. TyLisa C. Johnson, ‘The Cameras Are Always On’: Student Surveillance and Privacy Protection
in the Age of E-Learning, PUBLICSOURCE (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.publicsource.org/the-camerasare-always-on-student-surveillance-and-privacy-protection-in-the-age-of-e-learning/
[https://perma.cc/VW3N-8MQ2].
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cyber threats and cyberattacks. 58 Privacy experts explain that “[s]ome
threats are old–phishing and ransomware attacks and data
breaches–and some are new, birthed strictly from the shift to a virtual
learning environment amid COVID-19, such as ‘Zoom-bombing,’
where an unauthorized person enters and disrupts a Zoom meeting.”59
Ultimately, cybersecurity issues are further disrupting student learning
during the COVID-19 pandemic.60
Additionally, the collection of personal data from students for the
purpose of targeted advertising is a primary concern resulting from
students using educational technologies.61 Website operators collect

58. PRIV. TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., supra note 56, at 1–2.
59. Johnson, supra note 57; KHAN ET AL., supra note 14. Khan addresses widespread concern with
the Zoom application:
[W]ith the rapid growth of Zoom’s popularity, Zoom is now faced with massive
backlash as security professionals, privacy advocates, lawmakers, and even the FBI
warn that Zoom’s default settings are not safe. As a result, many companies such
as NASA, SpaceX, and countries, including Taiwan, USA, and the Australian
Defense force, banned Zoom for communication.
Id.; MARIA CLARE LUSARDI, ISAAC DUBOVOY & JEREMY STRAUB, DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF
CYBERSECURITY FAILURES DURING AND ATTRIBUTABLE TO PANDEMICS AND OTHER EMERGENCY
SITUATIONS (2020) (“Schools that have turned to remote instruction have faced problems with video
conferences being hijacked. The FBI reported that it[] ‘has received multiple reports of conferences being
disrupted by pornographic and/or hate images and threatening language.’”); Luke Barr, FBI Warns of
Cyberattacks
to
Distance
Learning,
ABC NEWS
(Jan.
4,
2021,
4:02
PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fbi-warns-cyberattacks-distance-learning/story?id=75038470
[https://perma.cc/K2S7-TG6A] (“Another common incident that happens, . . . is ‘zoombombing’—a
practice where criminals enter an online classroom and post or yell a racist or inflammatory slur.”);
Michael Goodyear, The Dark Side of Videoconferencing: The Privacy Tribulations of Zoom and the
Fragmented State of U.S. Data Privacy Law, 10 HOUS. L. REV. 76, 77 (2020) (“Zoom’s risky and
intentionally aggressive privacy practices have led some to conclude that the increased use of Zoom is a
‘privacy disaster waiting to happen.’”).
60. See Alyson Klein, Cyberattacks Disrupt Learning Even More During COVID-19, EDUC. WK.
(Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/technology/cyberattacks-disrupt-learning-even-more-duringcovid-19/2020/09 [https://perma.cc/YX3E-N6Q6]; see also Barr, supra note 59. Quoting FBI Cyber
Section Chief Dave Ring, Barr explains the projected increase in cybersecurity attacks following the move
to virtual education:
The broader the move to distance learning, I think the more attacks you’re going to
see, just simply because there are more opportunities for it and it’s more
disruptive . . . . Not everybody’s looking to make money when it comes to criminal
motivations for these attacks. A lot are [there] looking to steal information.
Id. (statement of Dave Ring, FBI Cyber Section Chief); Alan Butler & Enid Zhou, Disease and Data in
Society: How the Pandemic Expanded Data Collection and Surveillance Systems, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 1577,
1613 (2021) (“[T]here has . . . been an exponential growth in the collection, use, and dissemination of
personal data online as people have become increasingly reliant on remote access to work, school, social
services, and other necessities.”).
61. See Complying with COPPA, supra note 8.
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personal information from children because “[c]hildren are an
attractive audience for marketers because their interest in a product can
influence a family’s purchasing habits and shape future behaviors.”62
For example, the mobile application “Take With Me Learning,” which
offers interactive teaching lessons to students, was created by a
company that was illegally collecting student data and selling it to
advertisers, which made student information fully accessible without
limitation.63 This type of data collection makes students susceptible to
criminal activity and exposes students to dangers such as tracking,
fraud, harassment, and identity theft. 64 Any failure on COPPA’s part
to adequately protect students (and not just children under thirteen)
from illegal data collection and cybersecurity attacks creates real and
irreversible consequences.65
Although the COVID-19 pandemic introduced additional privacy
threats as a result of increased virtual education measures, student
online privacy concerns do not end here; even as the pandemic
subsides, educators will continue incorporating aspects of virtual
learning in their teaching. 66 At this point, “[i]t is possible that more
62. Olivia Levinson, Note, Embedded Deception: How the FTC’s Recent Interpretation of the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Missed the Mark, 105 MINN. L. REV. 2007, 2012 (2021);
Matecki, supra note 9, at 388 (“Today, one of the most prevalent uses of personal information online is a
web operator’s ability to create effective and targeted advertising. Online advertising has grown to a nearly
ten[-]billion[-]dollar industry in recent years. By using personal information gathered online, marketers
can effectively target audiences based on interests, demographics, and any other factor about a person that
can be ascertained from web history and online behavior.” (citations omitted)); Allison Schiff, The FTC’s
Review of COPPA Could Transform How Kids Content Is Monetized Online, AD EXCHANGER (Oct. 8,
2019, 3:25 PM), https://www.adexchanger.com/privacy/the-ftcs-review-of-coppa-could-transform-howkids-content-is-monetized-online/ [https://perma.cc/YPY4-76V4] (“It’s a misconception that COPPA
outlaws targeting children with advertising. It simply imposes certain requirements, particularly the need
to get verifiable parental consent for data collection, on the operators of websites or online services
directed at children under [thirteen].”).
63. Peddy, supra note 19, at 126.
64. Id. at 128–29.
65. See id. at 130.
66. See Jessica Dickler, Post-pandemic, Remote Learning Could Be Here to Stay, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/20/post-pandemic-remote-learning-could-be-here-to-stay.html
[https://perma.cc/MFS2-7L4H] (May 26, 2020, 12:56 PM); see also Tiffany C. Li, Post-pandemic Privacy
Law, 70 AM. U.L. REV. 1681, 1712 (2021). Because schools will likely continue using distance education
technologies even after the COVID-19 pandemic slows down, “[w]hatever laws and legal norms we create
to address this pandemic will not be isolated to this pandemic.” Id.; Li, supra note 51, at 859. Similarly,
“[s]ociety must protect the health of its people, but we must remain vigilant about privacy incursions[]
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schools will rely on distance education in the future, perhaps due to
familiarity gained by faculty, staff, and students during the
pandemic.”67 Students will transition back to primarily in-person
classes; however, schools will still implement educational
technologies and thus continue exposing students to illegal data
collection and cyber threats.
B. COPPA’s Shortcomings in Protecting Students from Privacy
Threats
Overall, COPPA’s “lack of enforcement has rendered COPPA’s
application to schools unclear and unworkable.”68 As explained in
Part I, COPPA and its protections do not directly apply to schools.69
Schools can thus give consent on behalf of parents to release their
children’s information, meaning that schools put themselves in the
middle of the relationship between website operators and parents. 70
Regarding the mobile application “Take With Me Learning,” parents
discovered that their children’s schools required students to use this
application, but the schools circumvented their parental consent in its
dealings with the application operator, subjecting students to the
because shifts in privacy norms now will lead to lasting repercussions even after the emergency has
ended.” Id. Legal scholars are stressing the fact that looking to the future in a post-pandemic world is
essential when considering how technology is used and how changes in privacy law apply to the new
normal. See id.
67. Li, supra note 51, at 794.
68. Peddy, supra note 19, at 131; O’Donnell, supra note 9, at 469, 470.
69. See supra Part I.
70. Herold, supra note 11; Peddy, supra note 19, at 136 (“In application, COPPA requires that before
a third-party operator authorizes a child under thirteen to use its website and services, it must provide
notice and obtain verifiable parental consent. However, operators contracted within the school setting
must provide such notice directly to the school, not to the parent.”). But see Jennifer Thompson, School
or Parent? Factors Playing into the FTC’s Analysis of Who Should Provide Parental Consent Under
COPPA in the Age of EdTech, JDSUPRA (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/school-orparent-factors-playing-into-69062/ [https://perma.cc/2MTX-LQGS]. Thompson describes the practical
effects of requiring every single parent to approve education technologies for their children:
From a purely administrative point of view, the schools have a compelling
argument for being able to provide consent for the community. If individual
families are required to provide the consent, not only would the schools have to
track which family has approved which EdTech technology, the schools would also
have to come up with alternative curriculum options for students that do not want
to use the available EdTech.
Id.
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collection and distribution of their personal information for targeted
advertising purposes.71 The “Take With Me Learning” example is not
an isolated incident; schools often circumvent parental consent in
practice.72
Additionally, “many educators have not been apprised of the risks
and legal ramifications of using . . . online schooling methods without
first securing proper permission from parents or guardians.”73 So, not
only does COPPA not apply directly to schools as entities but
educators are typically unaware of the privacy consequences
associated with implementing educational technologies without
getting parental permission.74 Students, especially teenagers, are
therefore left with privacy protections that do not apply to their
educational institutions and are ultimately disregarded by their
educators.75 As a result, “a gap exists between the protection of a
child’s privacy at home and a child’s privacy while at school.”76 This
gap highlights COPPA’s inadequacies when applied in the context of
educational technologies and distance-learning tools.
C. COPPA’s “Educational Context” Limitation
Although COPPA does not apply to schools as entities, whether a
school can grant COPPA consent on behalf of parents “varies under
certain circumstances.”77 The FTC explains that “the school’s ability
71. Peddy, supra note 19, at 126–27.
72. See Herold, supra note 11.
73. Keene, supra note 49.
74. See id.; Peddy, supra note 19, at 157. Because educators are usually unaware of the dangers that
stem from implementing educational technologies without first obtaining parental consent for data
collection, legal scholars have suggested requiring teachers or school administrators to complete a
certified student-data privacy course annually to help minimize confusion surrounding data privacy in
educational technologies. Id.; Cameron Sullivan, How COPPA Affects Schools, LEARNSAFE (Nov. 18,
2019), https://learnsafe.com/how-coppa-affects-schools/ [https://perma.cc/J3F3-TG6D] (“Teachers need
to be aware of what COPPA requires for the technology and sites they use in the classroom. Sometimes,
a teacher can provide the necessary consent. This is somewhat of a grey area. It’s often hard to know in
what circumstances teachers can give consent.”).
75. See Keene, supra note 49.
76. Peddy, supra note 19, at 136.
77. See Herold, supra note 11 (statement of Bill Fitzgerald, Director of Privacy-Evaluation Initiatives,
Common Sense Media); Sullivan, supra note 74. Schools granting consent on behalf of parents is not a
straightforward process:
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to consent for the parent is limited to the educational context—where
an operator collects personal information from students for the use and
benefit of the school, and for no other commercial purpose.”78 Schools
are thus not allowed to grant consent on behalf of parents if website
operators are collecting information from children for purposes that
are unrelated to education. 79 The FTC’s reasoning behind this
determination is that “the scope of the school’s authority to act on
behalf of the parent is limited to the school context.”80 Although this
limitation appears to fully protect students from having their personal
information used and disclosed while using educational technologies,
in practice that is not always the case.81
First, COPPA’s educational context limitation does little to protect
students because website operators embed third-party trackers into
their sites for analytics and advertising purposes.82 Third-party
tracking refers to a website allowing other companies to collect

COPPA requires sites to obtain parental consent before collecting or using data
from users under the age of [thirteen]. If students access the [I]nternet for class,
schools and teachers may have to take on this responsibility. Schools may have to
ask for verifiable parental consent on the site’s behalf, give consent in place of a
parent, or request the deletion of collected data. However, the law does not always
make it clear how the consent has to be obtained. Some schools may simply send
home a note asking for parental consent for [I]nternet use in the classroom. This
wouldn’t be the appropriate level of consent. Teachers need to list specific sites and
what information they gather.
Id.; Thompson, supra note 70 (“Some educators have called for additional direction from the FTC as to
when schools can provide consent, what obligations service providers have and what rights parents have
with respect to information collected from students.”).
78. Complying with COPPA, supra note 8. The FTC recommends that schools ask potential operators
the following questions before entering into an agreement that allows for student data collection:
What types of personal information will the operator collect from students? How
does the operator use this personal information? Does the operator use or share
information for commercial purposes not related to the provision of the online
services requested by the school? . . . Does the operator enable the school to review
and have deleted the personal information collected from their students? . . . What
measures does the operator take to protect the security, confidentiality, and
integrity of the personal information it collects? What are the operator’s data
retention and deletion policies for children’s personal information?
Id.
79. See Herold, supra note 11.
80. Complying with COPPA, supra note 8.
81. See Herold, supra note 11.
82. Id.
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information from Internet users to deliver targeted advertisements. 83
Even though the FTC requires that operators disclose these tracking
services to schools, “vendors often don’t provide that information to
schools, or do so only in vague or conditional terms.”84 Additionally,
regarding the COPPA statute, “its language generates confusion about
which third-party operators must follow regulations for online privacy
and who is at risk for sanctions if they don’t comply.”85
The third-party tracking practice is problematic in educational
technologies because, for example, Zoom allows third parties to access
student data, and thousands of schools nationwide adopted the Zoom
platform for virtual education purposes as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic.86 Even though a school’s ability to consent for the parent is
limited to education purposes, the school may still be allowing student
data collection without consent if site operators do not disclose
third-party tracking.
Another reason the educational context limitation is ineffective is
because the websites and services that schools require students to use
often have overlapping educational and commercial applications. 87

83. How to Protect Your Privacy Online, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 2021),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-protect-your-privacy-online [https://perma.cc/79TC-NA56];
All You Need to Know About Third-Party Cookies, COOKIE SCRIPT BLOG, https://cookie-script.com/allyou-need-to-know-about-third-party-cookies.html [https://perma.cc/SC2U-WB5B] (Dec. 21, 2021). The
following is an example of how third-party trackers collect information to deliver targeted advertisements:
Let’s say earlier in the week you looked up some vacation rentals in Cancun. You
browsed a few websites, admired the photos of the sunsets and sandy beaches, but
ultimately decided to wait another year before planning your vacation. A few days
go by and suddenly it seems like you are seeing ads for Cancun vacations on many
websites you visit. Is it a mere coincidence? Not really. The reason you are now
seeing these ads on vacationing in Cancun is that your web browser stored a
third-party cookie and is using this information to send you targeted
advertisements.
Id.
84. See Herold, supra note 11.
85. Peddy, supra note 19, at 130; All You Need to Know About Third-Party Cookies, supra note 83.
In addition to Zoom using third-party trackers, if students use any website that shows advertisements, they
can reasonably expect that website to have first- and third-party cookies collecting information. See All
You Need to Know About Third-Party Cookies, supra note 83.
86. Cheri Kiesecker, What You Need to Know About Zoom for Education, STUDENT PRIV. MATTERS:
PARENT COAL. FOR STUDENT PRIV. BLOG (Aug. 11, 2020), https://studentprivacymatters.org/tag/zoomthird-party-tracking/ [https://perma.cc/UN86-RRFW].
87. See id.
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Consider the following example of Google’s overlapping functions in
school settings:
It’s not at all unusual for students to enter one of G Suite’s
educational services through their student accounts, then
venture out from there to one of Google’s commercial
services, like Maps or Search. For years, Google has
declined to provide detailed answers to questions about
exactly how it collects and uses information generated by
students in those circumstances–making it difficult for
schools to determine for COPPA purposes whether G Suite
is strictly for the benefit of schools and students within the
‘educational context.’88
Although Google offers educational services for students, it is easy
for students to flip between Google’s educational and commercial
services, which creates questions of how students’ information gets
collected and used.89 Even though students appear to be protected from
website operators that collect children’s personal information for
commercial purposes, uncertainty arises when websites and services
that are not purely educational are used for educational purposes, such

88. See Herold, supra note 11.
89. See Natasha Singer, How Google Took Over the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/technology/google-education-chromebooks-schools.html
[https://perma.cc/R9GK-4YHU]. Confusion over how student information is being collected by platforms
like Google is problematic because “[u]nlike Apple or Microsoft, which make money primarily by selling
devices or software services, Google derives most of its revenue from online advertising—much of it
targeted through sophisticated use of people’s data.” Id. Students may therefore be using services like
Google for educational purposes while Google is collecting student data for commercial purposes. See id.
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as some of Google’s services.90 As a result, “the lines of COPPA
compliance become blurred.”91
D. COPPA and Teenage Students
Because COPPA only applies to children under thirteen, the rule’s
protections do not include teenage students using educational
technologies at the direction of their institutions.92 COPPA’s critics
recognize that “teenagers are vulnerable to information misuse,
sometimes even more so than young children.”93 For one, teenagers’
online vulnerability may stem from their increased susceptibility to
targeted advertisements that prey on their “psychological
weaknesses.”94 Yet websites and services directed toward teenagers
are not subject to COPPA enforcement.95
Recognizing this limitation, COPPA critics believe that “[t]he
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act is long overdue for
improvements to protect the rights of older teens who spend so much
time on mobile and online platforms but who aren’t always savvy
90. See Kiesecker, supra note 86; Singer & Conger, supra note 38. The uncertainty of determining
whether technologies have educational or commercial purposes in schools is particularly concerning
considering Google’s reach in classrooms across the country. The following demonstrates Google’s
influence:
Today, more than half the nation’s primary- and secondary-school students—more
than [thirty] million children—use Google education apps like Gmail and Docs, the
company said. And Chromebooks, Google-powered laptops that initially struggled
to find a purpose, are now a powerhouse in America’s schools. Today they account
for more than half the mobile devices shipped to schools.
Singer, supra note 89.
91. Peddy, supra note 19, at 139.
92. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 6501; Complying with COPPA, supra note 8 (“Although COPPA does
not apply to teenagers, the FTC is concerned about teen privacy and does believe that strong, more
flexible, protections may be appropriate for this age group.”) (emphasis added).
93. Matecki, supra note 9, at 389. Matecki explains teenage vulnerability in the context of Internet
privacy issues:
The expanded abuse of young people’s personal information, along with other
dangers from over-sharing online since COPPA’s enactment, have proven that such
vulnerabilities are not limited to young people under thirteen. Given the social
pressures teens face to interact online, . . . it is no longer accurate to assume that
teenagers are protected from the risks of dissemination of personal information
online.
Id. at 399–400.
94. Id. at 390.
95. Id. at 389.
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enough to protect themselves from deceptive online ads and digital
manipulation.”96 But amending COPPA to include teenagers is
unlikely to resolve the underlying issues with COPPA’s application to
students; the complications arising from the third-party tracking
problem, and the inability to distinguish if a technology has purely
educational or commercial purposes, makes an amendment raising the
age requirement unworkable.
Regardless, the COVID-19 pandemic created a rush to online
schooling without careful or advanced planning, and most schools
made distance learning websites and technologies mandatory for
students.97 Thus, teenage students essentially had no choice but to use
the required education technology, despite the COPPA framework not
applying to teenagers (and even if it did, the protections would not
have been effective to begin with because of weak enforcement by the
FTC).98 Ultimately, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted
already-existing inadequacies with COPPA’s enforceability, painting
a clearer picture for why federal online privacy laws need reworking
to protect students when they use educational technologies.
96. Rachel Lerman, New Bill Would Update Decades-Old Law Governing Children’s Privacy Online,
Add
Protection
for
Teens,
WASH.
POST
(July
29,
2021,
4:52
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/07/29/coppa-update-teenagers-online/
[https://perma.cc/3M8K-PT4F] (statement of Linda Sherry, Director of National Priorities, Consumer
Action). On May 13, 2021, Senators Edward Markey and Bill Cassidy introduced the Children and Teens’
Online Privacy Protection Act that amends COPPA to protect children ages thirteen to fifteen. Children’s
and Teens’ Online Privacy Protection Act, S. 1628, 117th Cong. (2021); Hunton Andrews Kurth’s Privacy
& Cybersecurity, Senate Bill Would Expand Federal Children’s Privacy Protections, NAT’L L. REV. (May
12, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/senate-bill-would-expand-federal-children-s-privacyprotections [https://perma.cc/5HJY-EQBZ].
97. Keene, supra note 49; Li, supra note 66, at 1706–07 (“Students learning online have to accept the
privacy practices of every remote technology that schools insist on using. While some of these education
sites and apps may have strong privacy protections in place, many do not.” (citations omitted)); Butler &
Zhou, supra note 60, at 1614 (“Students do not have a choice but to ‘Zoom-in,’ . . . and smile for the
camera.”); Li, supra note 51, at 859 (Li explains that the COVID-19 public health emergency led to the
“deployment of privacy-invasive technologies and technologically influenced programs” and people
“have been asked to accept more and more privacy-violating technologies.”). Li describes the pandemic’s
effects on privacy rights:
The pandemic forced millions around the world to experience the effects of context
collapse, as we faced the slow blurring of the boundaries between previously
segmented social spaces, like work, school, home, and more. . . . Students lost the
educational privacy afforded to them by the physical space of schools and
universities.
Id. at 858.
98. See Keene, supra note 49.
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III. PROPOSAL
After recognizing COPPA’s inadequacies and shortcomings in light
of the COVID-19 pandemic, legal scholars offered recommendations
for addressing growing Internet privacy concerns. These
recommendations, however, must consider the challenges of
regulating not only the Internet’s expansiveness but also legislating in
an area already complicated by a web of privacy laws.99 Despite the
apparent challenges, improving young people’s privacy on the Internet
is still an attainable goal. 100 We can acknowledge that COPPA is
antiquated and still “revisit its objectives and offer a fresh approach
that is better adapted to today’s society and digital landscape.”101

A. Existing Recommendations for Addressing Internet Privacy
Concerns
One suggested approach is to strengthen the privacy laws that are
already in existence. 102 This measure would involve strengthening or
amending the COPPA statute to better address online privacy
concerns. A common suggestion is to make age-related amendments
to COPPA that would eliminate age specifications and give protections
to all website users regardless of age. 103 The idea is that “the
fundamental failure of COPPA is that its applicability is contingent
99. See Matecki, supra note 9, at 399. There are “challenges of drafting effective legislation to regulate
the Internet, especially given its expansive nature.” Id.; Li, supra note 51, at 860 (“It is difficult to grasp
the full landscape of privacy in pandemic, due to the ever-expanding web of laws and regulations that
touch upon privacy and technology.”).
100. See Stephen Beemsterboer, COPPA Killed the Video Star: How the YouTube Settlement Shows
that COPPA Does More Harm Than Good, 25 ILL. BUS. L.J. 63, 83 (2020) (“[T]his is not to say that
children’s privacy on the [I]nternet is an unattainable goal.”).
101. Id.; O’Donnell, supra note 9, at 495 (“Both the VPPA and COPPA are antiquated; however, both
can be fixed.”).
102. See, e.g., Li, supra note 66, at 1715.
103. See Matecki, supra note 9, at 398 (“Some commentators have suggested that an overhaul of
COPPA that eliminates age distinctions and parental consent requirements would be the most effective
means of revision. . . .”); see also Beemsterboer, supra note 100 (“Congress should adopt [I]nternet
privacy regulations that apply protections to all users regardless of age.”).
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upon age.”104 Making age-related amendments to COPPA seems like
an attractive solution; however, the approach faces criticism. For one,
removing COPPA’s age distinction goes against the legislative intent
to protect children under thirteen who are deemed generally incapable
of making Internet privacy decisions without parental consent. 105
Regardless, simply removing age distinctions in the COPPA statute
while making no other changes is not likely to lead to any significant
changes in privacy protections as long as the FTC continues to enforce
COPPA weakly and produce unimpressive settlements.
That being said, improving COPPA may require adjusting the
FTC’s enforcement and settlement policies, which is not a COPPA
amendment at all. 106 A stronger enforcement measure could involve
setting the penalty for violating COPPA as a percentage of the
company’s income, like in the European Union where regulators set
damages at 4% of the violating company’s income.107 This measure
creates a penalty that monetarily affects companies violating COPPA,
as opposed to having companies pay an arguably insignificant penalty
that does little to deter COPPA violations. 108 Addressing COPPA’s
underlying enforcement issues may better protect data privacy in the
long run.
Additionally, with the recognition that “rights to educational
privacy are limited,” some commentators recommend “creating a right
to educational privacy” because COPPA’s protections are simply not

104. Beemsterboer, supra note 100.
105. Matecki, supra note 9, at 398 (“[W]hile a revision to COPPA eliminating all age barriers would
address the problematic concept of parental consent, it ignores the particular vulnerabilities of children
and adolescents and, as such, would push aside the original legislative intent of COPPA regulations.”).
106. O’Donnell, supra note 9, at 495 (“[I]t follows that the area that needs the most attention might not
be in COPPA itself; instead, the FTC’s settlement policy needs to change. FTC settlements need to
monetarily impact the companies charged with violating COPPA.”); Kimberly Dempsey Booher & Martin
B. Robins, American Privacy Law at the Dawn of a New Decade (And the CCPA and COVID-19):
Overview and Practitioner Critique, 24 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 169, 199 (2020). But “[w]hile it is
appropriate for the FTC to demonstrate that the [COPPA] statute is not a dead letter by going after those
who blatantly disregard its existence, this will not suffice.” Id. (citations omitted).
107. O’Donnell, supra note 9, at 495–96.
108. See id. at 495; see also What’s Going on with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA)?, supra note 9 (“If you fine the local bakery a million dollars, it’s dead. If you fine Google a
million dollars, does it deter them from misbehaving in the future? They can pay that fine over and over
without having to restructure a thing.”).
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enough.109 This measure suggests leaving COPPA intact and enacting
a separate educational privacy law for students. 110 Although creating a
separate right to educational privacy may appear to accomplish the
goal of protecting students in educational settings who use virtual
learning technologies, another privacy law that is similar to COPPA
may face similar enforcement challenges. Given the continuing issue
of the FTC weakly enforcing the existing COPPA statute, there is no
guarantee that a separate statute protecting the privacy rights of
students would be enforced to any significant degree under the FTC’s
authority.111 Simply creating a statute similar to COPPA, but for
students in educational settings, would not fully prevent the
unauthorized collection and use of student data.
Another recommendation that goes beyond amending the COPPA
statute is to create a separate statute that serves as an absolute
prohibition on website operators collecting information for
commercial purposes in certain environments.112 An absolute
prohibition would prevent the collection of personal data or
information even if parental consent is obtained, which in turn creates
an absolute protection that can be consistently applied. 113 This
approach claims to “eliminate[] any of the previous confusion caused
by the need to obtain ‘verifiable parental consent’” and “prevent both
inconsistent interpretation and potential violations of student

109. Li, supra note 66, at 1707, 1716; What is FERPA? U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.: PROTECTING STUDENT
PRIV., https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/what-ferpa [https://perma.cc/UT2Z-CWS2]. The Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), although technically an education privacy statute, is a
federal law that gives “parents the right to have access to their children’s education records, the right to
seek to have the records amended, and the right to have some control over the disclosures of personally
identifiable information from the education records.” Id. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (FERPA
statute); 34 C.F.R. § 99 (2022) (FERPA regulations). FERPA thus primarily deals with education records
as opposed to students using educational technologies at school or in distance learning environments. See
generally § 1232(g); § 99.
110. See Li, supra note 66, at 1716.
111. See O’Donnell, supra note 9.
112. Peddy, supra note 19, at 154. The author suggests using the following language as an absolute
prohibition on collecting student data: “In a K-12 institution, no operator shall knowingly engage in
targeted advertising, sell a student’s information, or use a student’s personal information for any purpose
other than the educational purpose for which the operator was contracted, unless disclosure is made for
reasons required by law or court order.” Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 154–55.

Published by Reading Room, 2022

27

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 12

1246

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:4

privacy.”114 Yet it is difficult to determine from the outset if a statute
would completely eliminate confusion and be entirely straightforward
in its application. Any statute, even one labeled as an “absolute
prohibition,” could lend itself to different interpretations and
inconsistencies in application. Thus, a statute removing the parental
consent requirement and completely prohibiting online data collection
from children would not be sufficient by itself to resolve Internet
privacy concerns.
B. The European Union’s Approach to Data Protection and Online
Privacy
A final existing recommendation to improve Internet privacy
protections is for the legislature to pass a federal privacy law. 115
Currently, there is “no single federal law” that regulates online
privacy.116 A federal privacy law that reaches beyond just protecting
children under thirteen would serve to “create a national framework
for thinking about privacy instead of relying on a patchwork of sectoral
privacy laws that do not reflect the realities of privacy today.”117 This
type of overarching federal privacy law mirrors online privacy
standards set forth in the European Union. 118
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) is a law that
regulates how personal data can be processed and transferred, and its
114. Id.; A Four-Step Beginner’s Guide to COPPA Compliance, TWO HAT (Aug. 23, 2017),
https://www.twohat.com/blog/beginners-guide-coppa-compliance/
[https://perma.cc/2DBH-DQTB].
There is a general consensus that COPPA is difficult to fully understand, with commentators noting that
COPPA is a “large and complex rule” and it “can be confusing to navigate.” Id.; Sullivan, supra note 74
(“COPPA compliance requirements can be unclear.”).
115. Li, supra note 66, at 1714; Li, supra note 51, at 860 (“[I]t is past time for Congress to pass a
national privacy law that would provide cohesive, coherent rules based on core privacy values, that could
then be translated to different sectors, industries, types of data, and types of data actors.”); Butler & Zhou,
supra note 60, at 1626–27 (“Over the last few years there has been significant interest in Congress
establishing a comprehensive data protection framework, but Congress has not yet succeeded in passing
such a law.”).
116. Internet Privacy Laws Revealed, supra note 1; Butler & Zhou, supra note 60, at 1623 (“Unlike
most other developed countries, the United States does not have . . . any entity singularly charged with
overseeing business practices that impact user data.”); Data Privacy Laws: What You Need to Know in
2022, OSANO (June 24, 2020), https://www.osano.com/articles/data-privacy-laws
[https://perma.cc/UW9N-MXE7].
117. Li, supra note 66, at 1714.
118. Id. at 1714–15.
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applicability is relatively broad in scope. 119 The GDPR is the source of
the provision that sets noncompliance fines at 4% of the company’s
annual revenue if the company violates the law. 120 Ultimately, the
GDPR requires that “whenever information directly or indirectly
identifying you as an individual is stored or processed, your data
protection rights have to be respected.”121 The GDPR serves as an
all-encompassing protection against the collection and use of online
personal information.
Because the GDPR offers broad protections, “most consumers are
pleased with the precedent of data protection that the GDPR has
set.”122 Compared to the FTC’s weak enforcement of COPPA, in the
first year of GDPR’s enforcement, there were 144,000 complaints filed
with GDPR enforcement agencies and $63 million in fines issued.123
Google also faced a $57 million fee for noncompliance under the
GDPR for its data harvesting practices. 124 Companies that fail to
comply with GDPR’s requirements are subject to these penalties and
large fines.125 Currently, online privacy enforcement procedures in the
United States are nowhere near GDPR enforcement levels.
119. European Union–Data Privacy and Protection, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
https://www.trade.gov/european-union-data-privacy-and-protection [https://perma.cc/CK8X-TCV2].
120. Id.
121. Data
Protection
and
Online
Privacy,
YOUR
EUR.,
https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/internet-telecoms/data-protection-onlineprivacy/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/72JV-EKUN] (July 1, 2022).
122. Rob Sobers, A Year in the Life of the GDPR: Must-Know Stats and Takeaways, VARONIS: INSIDE
OUT SEC. BLOG, https://www.varonis.com/blog/gdpr-effect-review/ [https://perma.cc/EYQ3-2JUQ]
(June 17, 2020).
123. Id. If there is a confirmed GDPR violation, fines are levied against the offending company in the
following way:
If there is a less serious violation the administrative fines can go up to 10 000 000
EUR (10 million euro), or in the case of an undertaking, up to 2% of the total
worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. In
case of more serious violations this goes up to 20 000 000 EUR (20 million euro)
or 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year,
whichever is higher. These fines are substantial and can financially cripple
companies and even put some companies out of business. It is therefore important
to fulfill the obligations under the GDPR.
Alex Tolsma, GDPR Top Ten #7: Data Protection Authority Enforcement Methods, DELOITTE,
https://www2.deloitte.com/ch/en/pages/risk/articles/gdpr-data-protection-authority-enforcementmethods.html [https://perma.cc/UG47-2CNP].
124. Sobers, supra note 122.
125. Id.
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The GDPR does, however, include specific rules for children that
are similar to COPPA’s requirements.126 Parental approval is required
for children to access online services that use children’s personal data,
but parental consent is no longer required once the child is sixteen
years old (in some EU countries) as opposed to thirteen years old in
the United States. 127 More notable is the fact that the EU created a
privacy law across all EU countries that includes a subset of specific
rules applicable only to children. And because COPPA critics are
especially concerned with privacy rights for students using educational
technologies in a COVID-19 pandemic world, creating a
comprehensive federal privacy law in the United States that also
provides specific rules for students becomes an attractive option.
C. The Solution: A Federal Privacy Law with Narrower Rules for
Students Using Educational Technologies
The GDPR is an excellent privacy law model for the United States,
both in the types of conduct that the GDPR protects and in how the
GDPR is enforced. In comparison, “COPPA is a relatively ‘short &
sweet’ piece of US legislation covering a handful of distinct areas.
GDPR looks very different. . . . [I]t provides a complete security and
protection framework for the processing of EU residents’ data—both
126. Data Protection and Online Privacy, supra note 121. On its website, the UK’s Information
Commissioner’s Office provides guidance for organizations that process children’s personal data that
focuses on the “additional, child specific considerations” of the GDPR. Children and the UK GDPR,
About This Guidance, INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-dataprotection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/children-and-the-uk-gdpr/
[https://perma.cc/BGJ9-JZMA]. This is because the “UK GDPR contains provisions intended to enhance
the protection of children’s personal data and to ensure that children are addressed in plain clear language
that they can understand.” Id. Recital 38 of the UK GDPR explains the reasoning behind children receiving
specific protections:
Children require specific protection with regard to their personal data as they may
be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards concerned and their rights
in relation to the processing of personal data. Such specific protection should, in
particular apply to the use of personal data of children for the purposes of marketing
or creating personality or user profiles and the collection of personal data with
regard to children when using services offered directly to a child.
Children and the UK GDPR, What Should Our General Approach to Processing Children’s Personal
Data Be?, INFO. COMM’R’S OFF., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-tothe-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/children-and-the-uk-gdpr/what-should-our-generalapproach-to-processing-children-s-personal-data-be/ [https://perma.cc/3AFY-P5L9].
127. Data Protection and Online Privacy, supra note 121.
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online and offline.”128 A privacy law viewed as “short and sweet” can
hardly be said to offer the same level of data privacy protections as a
more comprehensive federal privacy law such as the GDPR. To be
consistent with foreign privacy protection standards, the United States
should adopt a federal privacy law that includes specific rules
protecting children under thirteen as well as specific rules protecting
students using educational technologies.
But because the FTC has jurisdiction over commercial entities under
its authority to prevent unfair or deceptive trade practices, we arrive at
the same issue of FTC enforcement. 129 Before a federal privacy law
can be effective, additional measures need to be taken to ensure that
the law will be sufficiently enforced. On the bright side, the FTC
seemed to be aware (even before the COVID-19 pandemic) that
changes in privacy law were needed. 130 This is evidenced by the fact
that the FTC began conducting its ten-year review of COPPA four
years ahead of schedule back in 2019. 131 If the FTC addresses
widespread support for stricter COPPA enforcement, this could
encourage the FTC to administer harsher penalties if a federal privacy
law is enacted.
If enforcement issues are addressed and resolved, a federal privacy
law modeled after the GDPR that offers widespread Internet privacy
protections in addition to special rules for children and students would
offer the best protections for these groups. Similarly, the GDPR
already includes rules specific to children using websites and
technologies: “If your product or service offering is squarely
child-focused, there are specific child-related provisions to follow
(relating to consent, for instance). But at the same time, you’ll need to
get to grips with all aspects of GDPR.”132 Website operators are not
only required to comply with the GDPR’s child-related provisions but
128. Archie Stephens, The Relationship Between COPPA and GDPR: Getting it Right for Your
Business, PRIV. COMPLIANCE HUB (June 2018), https://www.privacycompliancehub.com/gdprresources/the-relationship-between-coppa-and-gdpr-getting-it-right-for-your-business/
[https://perma.cc/GSA7-AZGF].
129. Data Privacy Laws: What You Need to Know in 2022, supra note 116.
130. See O’Donnell, supra note 9, at 495.
131. Id.; Murphy et al., supra note 42; Fair, supra note 44.
132. Stephens, supra note 128.
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also with the entirety of the GDPR rules and requirements. Following
this framework, a federal privacy law in the United States couldshould
require website and service operators to comply with student-related
provisions of the statute in addition to overarching federal privacy
laws. This way, students using educational technologies in a school
setting or at the direction of their instructions will be offered an
additional layer of protection that goes beyond current COPPA
protections.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted COPPA to prevent young children’s personal
information from ending up in the wrong hands. By requiring parental
consent before website operators could collect personal information
from children under thirteen years old, the aim was to give parents
more control to protect their children’s information online.133 Despite
the goal of increasing parental involvement, COPPA protections do
not apply in school settings. 134 So, in practice, teachers and
administrators are requiring students to use websites and technologies
that collect and distribute student information without parental
consent, which is precisely the type of conduct that COPPA
protections seek to avoid. The existing problem has only been
exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic because the rush to conduct
online school led to a steep increase in students of all ages using
educational technologies.135 The recent cybersecurity concerns
emerging from life online are bringing attention to defects in the
United States’ outdated privacy laws. Although a comprehensive
federal privacy law modeled after the European Union’s GDPR could
offer more expansive online privacy protections, the FTC’s weak
enforcement of existing privacy statutes places this goal slightly out of
reach. Yet the increase in conversations in the legal community

133. See Complying with COPPA, supra note 8.
134. Id.
135. See Keene, supra note 49.
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regarding post-pandemic cybersecurity concerns may very well lead to
stricter enforcement of online privacy laws in the near future.
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